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## THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT BETWEEN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN BEFORE AND AFTER THE 44 DAY WAR

### ANALYTICAL REPORT



SOCIAL  
RESEARCH  
CENTER



## About the Social Research Center

The Social Research Center (SRC) was established by Decree No. 525 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan dated February 8, 2019. It operates as a public legal entity, systematically analyzing the development dynamics of social relations. The SRC identifies current trends, forecasts changes in this field, and investigates their potential impact on society. Applying modern information technologies and scientific approaches, the SRC conducts social research and surveys public opinion. Its findings are then provided to governmental bodies for consideration and action.

**SOCIAL RESEARCH CENTER**

**AZERBAIJAN BAROMETER**

Thirteenth edition

November 2020

**THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT BETWEEN ARMENIA  
AND AZERBAIJAN BEFORE AND AFTER THE 44 DAY WAR**

**ANALYTICAL REPORT**

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Baku - 2020

“Azerbaijan Barometer” magazine was registered under number 4247 in the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Azerbaijan on August 6, 2019.

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Proofread and signed: 11.10.2023

Physical print sheet: 5.2

Order: 34

Print run: 500

Printed in the printing house of “MM-S” enterprise.

**Address:** Republic of Azerbaijan, AZ 1102, Baku city,  
Nasimi district, A. Taghizade street, house 13.

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## Introduction

The pandemic, which has turned into a global threat, not only affects the economic and social value chain of countries but also influences the existing geopolitical order and dynamics. Negative trends observed in the global political and security environment create favorable conditions for the emergence of new conflicts, even in long-standing disputed regions. Consequently, local and regional conflicts disrupt the geopolitical balance, leading to changes in established configurations and the emergence of new global political realities.

According to a report by the Systemic Peace Center, covering armed conflicts from 1946 to 2019, the occurrence of both interstate and internal ethnic-national conflicts, as well as nearly transnational conflicts, significantly decreased in the 1990s. However, starting from the mid-2000s, there has been a resurgence in conflict levels. Over the past 15 years, the most notable increase in conflicts has been observed in Muslim-majority countries, as well as in the regions of North Africa and the Middle East.

According to a **\*\*YouGov\*\*** survey conducted two years ago in Europe and the United States (involving 9 countries and 9,000 respondents), citizens from both Europe and America expressed concern about the threat to peace worldwide. Interestingly, 64% of American citizens and 61% of British citizens believe that a world war is likely to occur in the near future. In this context, some political analysts predict that the relative calm in geopolitical conditions has prolonged all regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space, leading to a potential resolution of global, regional, and local tensions. Among the most devastating conflicts of the 20th century, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict continues to pose a serious threat to international peace and security due to its interstate nature. Armenia's transformation of the military-political focus from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border remains inevitable within the context of possible regional and geopolitical risks that support the current military-political conditions. Especially in the last four years of the military calendar, when we consider Armenia's military incursions into our sovereign territories on the one hand, which demonstrate the strength of the Azerbaijani army, and on the other hand, the preservation of the status quo and the presence

of Armenian forces in Azerbaijan's occupied territories remain the main reasons for tension in the conflict zone, indicating that the conflict's political resolution remains a major obstacle to international public opinion. Various research centers around the world analyze the political, social, and humanitarian aspects of interstate conflicts, as well as regional and international issues, based on public opinion. They provide proactive forecasts regarding the degree of possible threats and risks. According to a survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center of Russia in 2014 regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, half of the respondents (56%) consider it possible to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through peaceful means, while only 14% believe that the problem cannot be resolved without weapons. The weight of those who believe that Russia should take a neutral position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has sharply decreased from 60% to 36% over a period of two years (2014-2016). Additionally, 44% of respondents (in 2016) support mediation between the parties to stop bloodshed, whereas this indicator was 25% two years earlier.

According to a 2019 survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in Armenia, respondents were asked about the possibility of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict militarily within the next 5 years. While 37% of respondents found it very difficult to envision a military solution, 47% believed otherwise. Regarding the possibility of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through peaceful means, 43% of participants considered it possible, while 44% expressed the opposite view.

Additionally, based on sociological research conducted by the American Gallup International Association in Armenia, respondents ranked the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as the fourth most significant problem for the country, following issues related to unemployment, economic conditions, and low pensions and wages. Interestingly, only 26.1% of those surveyed considered the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to be the primary problem for Armenia. The fact that only one out of four Armenians identified the Nagorno-Karabakh issue as the country's main problem indicates that this issue does not greatly concern the Armenian population.

According to surveys conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) at

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.systemicpeace.org/conflictrends.html#fig2>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/world-war-iii-three-worldwide-conflict-west-western-countries-poultions-poll-russia-one-china-us-syria-uk-negative-a7513696.html>

<sup>3</sup> <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/dalekaya-voyna-rossiyane-o-perestrelkakh-v-nagornom-karabakhe>

<sup>4</sup> [https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2019am/NK4\\_2/](https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2019am/NK4_2/)

[https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2019am/NK4\\_1/](https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2019am/NK4_1/)

<sup>5</sup> 1803151.pdf

different times, the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict consistently ranks as the top concern among respondents. Specifically, 73% of those surveyed expressed greater concern about the non-liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions.

Interestingly, six years ago (in 2014), during a global survey conducted by the Gallup International Association across 64 countries (with 62,398 respondents, each country contributing 1,000 people), respondents generally expressed their readiness for armed conflict. 61% of respondents stated that they were prepared to fight for their countries, while 27% were not

willing to engage in combat. In terms of Azerbaijan, 85% of the Azerbaijani population is ready to fight for their homeland. Among nations willing to fight for their countries, Azerbaijan ranks 6th. For context, Georgians ranked 9th with 76%, and Armenians ranked 15th with 72%. In summary, while different global surveys approach the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from various perspectives related to international security, legal regulation, and principles of justice, the ever-changing geopolitical context demands systematic and comprehensive research into the military and political aspects of resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

## Material and moral damage to Azerbaijan as a result of the occupation of Armenia



### The number of monuments in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions

#### Monuments in the territories of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia

<b>901</b> state registered	<b>609</b> local	<b>285</b> State	<b>13</b> Internationally important
<b>50</b> tomb	<b>67</b> mosque	<b>92</b> sanctuary	<b>262</b> memorial
<b>39</b> castle	<b>32</b> bridge	<b>106</b> temple	<b>253</b> archaeological monument



### The number of destroyed mosques

<b>63</b> completely destroyed mosque	<b>4</b> mosques that were put into disrepair		
<b>13</b> Shusha	<b>8</b> Lachin	<b>8</b> Gubadli	<b>12</b> Zangilan
<b>16</b> Fuzuli	<b>5</b> Jabrayil	<b>5</b> Aghdam	



### Economic damage (Total economic damage is about \$1 trillion and 300,000 jobs lost)

<b>Lachin</b> 7.099.526.500 \$	<b>Jabrayil</b> 3.450.300.000 \$	<b>Tartar</b> 799.295,100 \$	<b>Beylegan</b> 3.812.500 \$
<b>Aghdam</b> 6.100.107.000 \$	<b>Zangilan</b> 3.414.170.000 \$	<b>Kazakh</b> 327.529.464 \$	<b>Aghstafa</b> 1.998.950 \$
<b>Fuzuli</b> 4.742.932.050 \$	<b>Kalbajar</b> 1.774.000.000 \$	<b>Gedebay</b> 44.303.800 \$	
<b>Shusha</b> 4.257.474.000 \$	<b>Gubadli</b> 1.485.627.000 \$	<b>Aghjabedi</b> 22.420.050 \$	



### Military spending (2009-2019)

<b>Expenditure on special defense projects and events</b> 10.314.000.000 ₼	<b>Defense costs</b> 20.636.000.000 ₼
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## GENERAL ISSUES OF RESEARCH

In this study conducted by the Social Research Center, we analyze the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the political and military aftermath of Armenia's military provocation along the northwestern part of the Armenia-Azerbaijan state border towards Tovuz on July 12, 2020, and the outlook for resolving the conflict through military means in this context. Additionally, we assess the adequacy of reforms in military and political conditions during operations based on public opinion.

The study aims to explore citizens' perspectives on the political, military, and international ramifications of the Tovuz battles, which showcased Azerbaijan's ascendance in the region morally, politically, and militarily. This understanding could significantly influence the state's strategy concerning Karabakh and the effectiveness of its political initiatives, including the attainment of propaganda objectives. The survey-based report is structured into five main sections, each addressing specific aspects.

Within the "War" section, we delve into the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the resurgence of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue through military means amidst Armenia's recent provocations, and the socio-political dimensions of the warfare option, all through the lens of public opinion.

In the "military-political" block, the public perception of the military provocation of Armenia on the border with Azerbaijan in the direction of Tovuz, the causes and consequences of the provocation, as well as the changes caused by the military-political conditions are evaluated on the basis of public opinion.

In the "legal-political" block, international factors in the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijani conflict, as well as the support of the military-political conditions by the government with adequate personnel reforms, are evaluated on the basis of public opinion.

In the "Humanitarian" bloc, the public attitude towards the national solidarity show of support for the Azerbaijani state and army on July 14, 2020 is reflected.

In the "Information" block, there is a study of the main sources of information and the degree of reliability of the respondents in war conditions.

### OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE RESEARCH

The research aims to investigate public

opinion regarding the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a key priority in Azerbaijan's foreign policy agenda, particularly against the backdrop of the July 12 Tovuz events. It seeks to conduct political analyses based on public sentiment regarding the potential for a military solution to the conflict and, consequently, to formulate scientifically grounded policy recommendations for the state in this regard, fostering outcome-driven policy-making. This report facilitates comparisons with the "Return to Karabakh" study conducted by the Center for Social Research during the conflict. To accomplish the study's objectives, the following tasks have been outlined.

- Study of the public attitude to the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict;

- Assessment of the decisive role of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan's foreign policy concept and the main directions of diplomatic activity on solving the problem based on the citizen's position;

- Studying the public attitude towards the political and legal regulatory activity of the UN related to the conflict and the role of its decisions in the peace negotiations in the direction of the settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict;

- Assessment of the nature and results of international factors in the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict based on public opinion;

- Studying the public attitude towards the participation of a number of countries and international organizations in the process of settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijani conflict;

- Evaluating the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group, which deals directly with the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and analyzing the results obtained;

- Studying the public attitude to the July 12 provocation by the Armenian armed forces on the border with Azerbaijan;

- Public view of the military-political aspects of the Tovuz operation and determination of the consequences of the military provocation in public opinion;

- Evaluation of the political, military, social, psychological and ideological aspects of the conflict resolution based on public opinion, as well as the study of the new values that the Tovuz battles brought to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict;

- The study focuses on public opinion

regarding the military resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan's border regions. Additionally, it involves a comparative analysis of respondents' opinions from these specific social and demographic groups with the overall research findings.

○ In the course of Tovuz operations, studying the public attitude to personnel reforms in accordance with the military and political conditions by the government and determining expectations in this direction;

○ Preparation of policy recommendations on the strengthening of the strategy carried out by the Azerbaijani state in the direction of the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, as well as the effectiveness of the main propaganda goals and perspectives of the new course;

○ Studying the main sources of information acquisition, trust, and access opportunities for the population during wartime. Conducting a comparative analysis of the obtained results with peacetime data and ensuring effective coordination in the information warfare against the enemy.

## METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF RESEARCH

### 1.1. Research areas

The survey covered the Baku, Absheron, Ganja-Kazakh, Sheki-Zagatala, Lankaran, Karabakh, Guba-Khachmaz, Central Aran and Nagorno-Shirvan economic-geographic regions of the republic. The Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and the occupied regions were not covered in the survey.

Half of the respondents who took part in the survey were selected from settlements located on the border with Armenia and the contact line with Nagorno-Karabakh. Surveys were conducted in 198 settlements in most border villages of the listed regions: Agstafa, Gazakh, Tovuz, Dashkasan, Gadabay, Goygol, Goranboy, Aghjabedi, Tartar, Agdam.

### 1.2. Selection of respondents

Within the framework of the study, the cluster sampling method was used in the selection of respondents. Using a multi-level stratification approach of random sampling gave every citizen an equal opportunity to participate in the survey.

In total, 198 clusters were randomly selected in selected addresses across the country, and the first 12 respondents in each cluster were included in the main sample.

Proportionality was ensured by paying special attention to socio-demographic indicators in

the selection of respondents.

A total of 2376 respondents took part in the survey. Based on the number of respondents covered by the survey, the margin of error of the results is 2% at a 95% confidence interval.

### 1.3. Research method

Quantitative method was used in the research.

### 1.4. Questionnaire

The questionnaire consists of a total of 53 questions, 43 of which are basic and 10 of which are demographic in 5 areas. The questions are grouped in the following areas:

**I direction "War" block**

**II direction "Military-political" block**

**III direction "Legal-political" block**

**IV direction "Humanitarian" block**

**V direction "Information" block**

### 1.5. Field work

The survey was conducted in the period from August 24 to September 9, 2020. The average survey time is 19 minutes and 20 seconds.

### 1.6. Method of inquiry

The "face-to-face" interview method was used in conducting the survey. Modern technologies have been applied in conducting surveys. Thus, SurveyToGo, a modern survey program, was used.

### 1.7. Ethical principles

Throughout the survey, ethical research guidelines were strictly adhered to. Hence, every respondent received comprehensive information about the survey's conducting organization, its purpose, and its protocols. Each participant was explicitly informed of the voluntary nature of their participation, their right to cease the survey at any point, and their option to refrain from expressing opinions on any question if they chose to do so. Moreover, they were assured they could reschedule the conversation if the initial call time was inconvenient.

Interview confidentiality was rigorously maintained, with anonymity guaranteed for all participants. Respondents were reassured that their individual responses would only be utilized in aggregated form. This measure significantly enhanced the reliability of the survey data collected.

### 1.8. Instruction


The survey involved 18 interviewers and 3 coordinators. The Social Research Center provided guidelines for the interviewers. Prior to commencing their duties, the interviewers underwent training conducted by the Center's staff. This training





## Regions surveyed (in %)

102 settlements included in the survey are located on the border with the Republic of Armenia and the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.



included comprehensive explanations regarding the survey's objectives and the questions posed to respondents. Additionally, interviewers conducted a test survey during the training process. Since the research was conducted during the pandemic, preventive measures were strictly followed by the employees of the Center. Before the survey, the interviewers were given extensive information about the observance of preventive rules in the training conducted by the employees of the Center. They were advised to use a medical mask and gloves during the survey, keep a two-meter distance from the respondent, and regularly disinfect hands. Employees are provided with protective equipment (gloves, masks, alcohol). As it was summer, the survey was conducted in open air. The gathering of other family members is restricted.

### 1.9. Data processing and analysis

Following the survey's completion, the data collected in the database for each questionnaire was analyzed using SPSS - Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. Pearson's correlation and  $X^2$  test were employed to identify statisti-

cally significant relationships between variables and to compare variables across different socio-demographic groups.

It's worth noting that implementing the natural experiment method in social, political, and economic research poses challenges due to various external factors. Nevertheless, this study can be considered a natural experiment to some extent. For instance, since a set of questions overlapped between the survey conducted from August 24 to September 9, 2020 (before the Civil War), and the survey conducted with internally displaced persons from October 9 to 13, it enables mutual comparison. This allows for an examination of how war influences people's thoughts and perspectives, facilitating the establishment of a reliable cause-and-effect relationship.

**Note 1:** Percentages in charts may not total 100% due to rounding.


**Note 2:** The question about social class aims to find out what class the respondents subjectively consider themselves to be, regardless of their financial situation.

## SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS OF RESPONDENTS




### Demographics


#### Gender




#### Age




#### Social class



#### Education level



#### Employment





## “WAR” BLOCK

### SECTION I. ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT IN PUBLIC OPINION

In the late 1980s, Azerbaijan was thrust into a military conflict due to the unconstitutional decision to incorporate the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province into the Armenian SSR, alongside efforts by the USSR leadership to detach it from Azerbaijani jurisdiction through the Special Management Committee. This conflict resulted in the violent occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory by Armenia. Despite the adoption of several significant international documents pertaining to the conflict, little progress has been made in their implementation. While peace talks have occasionally presented avenues for resolution, Armenia's steadfast and unconstructive stance, reinforced by the occupation of Azerbaijani territories through Nagorno-Karabakh, has hindered any peaceful political settlement thus far. Therefore, public perspectives on resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, currently undergoing dynamic changes, hold paramount importance in evaluating both the socio-political and military-political aspects of the conflict within the prevailing geopolitical landscape.

#### 1.1. The belief that war will break out in the near future

More than half of the respondents, totaling 56.1%, anticipate the onset of war in the near future to varying extents, while 39.1% express little or no belief in such an occurrence.

It's worth noting that during a previous survey, conducted against the backdrop of Armenia's persistent military provocations, 56.1% foresaw a larger-scale conflict in 2020, whereas

57.3% anticipated war, with 42.7% expressing disbelief. In that particular study, 47.9% of women and 62.7% of men expected hostilities due to Armenian provocations ( $X^2(1)=9.598$ ,  $p<0.01$ ).

As respondents' age increases, so does their expectation of imminent conflict. Among participants aged 18-30, 40% envisioned war, compared to 54.5% in the 31-50 age group and 63.1% among those over 51.

Over 52% of respondents across all educational levels anticipate war to some degree in the near future, with the highest proportion, 63.5%, among those with higher education. Notably, individuals with incomplete secondary education exhibited more skepticism, with 36% expressing no belief whatsoever ( $X^2(6)=32.356$ ,  $p<0.01$ ).


Among demographic groups, students display the highest confidence in the likelihood of war, with 23.3% expressing strong belief and 51.8% mostly believing in its occurrence. Following students, those employed in the private sector (67%) and individuals engaged in household activities (62.5%) are the next most likely to anticipate conflict. Approximately 60% of the unemployed also share this belief. Conversely, pensioners (9.7% “mostly do not believe”, 37.8% “not at all”) and housewives (11.4% “mostly do not believe”, 35.8% “never believe”) exhibit higher levels of skepticism.

Residents of Upper Karabakh exhibit the highest anticipation of imminent conflict, with 43.7% expressing strong belief and 25% mostly believing in its occurrence. Conversely, the lowest anticipation rate was recorded in Lankaran at 34.5%. In the western zone of Ganja-Gazakh, 53.3% of respondents anticipate war to varying degrees. Among those who hold disbelief, Shaki-Zagatala ranks highest (9.8% “mostly do not believe”, 45.9% “do not believe at all”). Notably, only 40 respondents from this economic region express disbelief in the likelihood of imminent conflict.

Among the refugee population, there are more people who believe that the war will start in the near future to one degree or another - 65.3%. For the other group, this indicator is



To what extent do you believe that war will start in the near future?





54.7%. “I don’t believe at all” was chosen by 20.2% of those with refugee status and 30% of those without. ( $X^2(3)=25.070$ ,  $p<0.01$ ).

“To what extent do you believe that war will start in the near future?” the answers to the question do not differ significantly for frontline and non-frontline regions - 60.7% and 52.8%, etc.

## 1.2. State and public readiness for war.

In this survey, 94.4% of respondents stated that both the state and the people of Azerbaijan are fully prepared for war, with only 2.9% expressing the opinion that the people are not ready. The gender breakdown for those who believe in the full readiness of the Azerbaijani state for war was nearly identical (95.3% for men and 93.5% for women), indicating a similar sentiment regarding the readiness of the Azerbaijani people.


Across different occupational groups, the perception of the state’s readiness for war remains consistent. Similarly, attitudes towards the readiness of the Azerbaijani people for war show minimal variation among these groups. There were no significant differences observed in readiness indicators between different economic regions for both the state and the people of Azerbaijan.

Among the “upper” social class, 84.8% believed that the state was fully prepared for war, compared to 69.2% among the “lower” social class.


Respondents who served in various capacities during the First Karabakh War, regardless of their location (front or non-front-line region), unanimously expressed the view that both the state and the people were fully prepared for war.

Interestingly, regardless of participation in the first Karabakh war, confidence in the state’s full readiness for war remains consistent at around 94.2% to 94.4% across different groups.

The belief in the full preparedness of the state and people of Azerbaijan for war remains consistent across groups, whether they have refugee status or not, with both groups showing overall indicators of over 90% expressing full readiness. Regardless of whether someone from the family members is currently in military service or not, both groups think that the state of Azerbaijan is equally fully prepared for war (93.8% and 94.5%). 96.8% of family members who are currently in military service, and 94.5% of those who are not, said that the people of




**The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.**



Azerbaijan are fully ready for war. Regardless of the region of residence (frontline or non-frontline region), respondents are almost equally prepared for war by both the people (93.7% and 96.4%) and the state (94.9% and 94%). said that.

## 1.3. Public attitude to the strength of the Azerbaijani army

98% of the respondents in this survey think that the Azerbaijani army is strong. In the survey on refugees, 95.9% of respondents believe that our army can restore its territorial integrity without the support of any foreign state.



The government's strong army-building policy was cited by both population groups, irrespective of their involvement in the first Karabakh war, as the primary reason for high confidence - 58% and 57.6%."

"In response to the question, 'Do you believe that only the current leadership of the country will solve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue by military means?' 83% of individuals who served on the front line in the First Karabakh War, and 82.9% of respondents in other categories answered 'yes.' For both groups, the


indicator of those who chose the answer 'no' was 14.7% (front line) and 13% (rear line). In other words, only 44 people among those who served on the front line in the First Karabakh War, and only 12 people among those who served on the rear front in the war answered 'no' to this question."

"As for the reasons behind the belief, while 32.8% of the 'upper' social class indicated that the current country's leadership correctly assessed the geopolitical environment, only 19.2% of the 'lower' social class chose this op-

## 1.4. Political leader factor in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem by military means

A significant majority of respondents, totaling 93.1%, hold the belief that only the current leadership of the country can resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue through military means. This conviction finds direct validation in the recent liberation of Azerbaijani lands from occupation, attributed to the resolute, rational, and visionary policies of President Ilham Aliyev, who serves as both the President and Commander-in-Chief. The confidence in the ability of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue militarily is reinforced by several factors. These include the government's robust army-building policies (57.6%), the country's leader's astute assessment of the geopolitical landscape (48.2%), recent victories over the adversary (39.9%), and successful military collaborations with various nations (34.2%). These factors collectively underscore the potential for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem solely under the guidance of the current administration. In terms of regional sentiment, the highest level of confidence in the ability of the Supreme Commander to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue through military means is observed in Nagorno-Shirvan, with an overwhelming 93.8% expressing this belief. In Upper Karabakh, this indicator stands at 88.3%. However, relatively lower levels of confidence were noted in Sheki-Zagatala (65.3%) and Absheron (68.5%).

"Regardless of their participation in the First Karabakh War, the same indicators were observed for both population groups (83% and 83.2%) in response to the question, 'Do you believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue will be resolved by military means only under the leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief?'



The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.

tion. Those who indicated the reason for their belief in the government's strong army-building policy are more prevalent in the 'upper' social class (62.7%) than in other social classes."

"A notable difference between places of residence was observed for only one of the reasons for trust. The option 'successful military cooperation with a number of countries' was cited by 37.8% of urban residents and 29.3% of rural residents."

"Do you believe that only the current leadership of the country will solve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue by military means?" those who answered "yes" to the question are more widespread among those living on the border with Armenia and the contact line with Nagorno-Karabakh than among residents living in other regions (90.5% and 77.9%).

### 1.5. External support factor for warring parties

The countries most mentioned to support Azerbaijan in the event of a potential war are Turkey (99.8%), Pakistan (99.6%), and Ukraine (93.2%). Conversely, for Armenia, the prominent supporters are Russia (98.2%), France (98.1%), the USA (84.3%), and Iran (82.3%).

Despite the expectation of support for Armenia from Russia, which stood at 98.2% among 2125 respondents, Russia, as one of the main co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, has refrained from intervening directly in the conflict, except for urging both parties to cease fire and initiate negotiations. This stance could be interpreted as allowing Azerbaijan to pursue the restoration of its territorial integrity.

Similarly, although 98.1% of 704 respondents anticipated support from France, President Emmanuel Macron's efforts to seek consensus among the Minsk Group co-chairs for a cessation of hostilities remained largely rhetorical. In essence, France's support for Armenia has been primarily diplomatic, with limited practical implications for Baku.

A comparable situation is evident regarding Iran, with 82.3% of 656 respondents expecting support for Armenia. Despite these expectations, Iran has provided only political backing to Azerbaijan in its rightful struggle.

While 93.2% of 177 respondents anticipated support from Ukraine, the country confined its assistance to political endorsement of Azerbaijan's cause.

Regarding the types of support expected, the

majority of respondents for Azerbaijan selected "all directions" (87.5%), while for Armenia, the preference leaned towards "military" support (82.4%). Although the expectation of support for Azerbaijan in all directions remained consistent across different education levels, those with higher education displayed a relatively higher inclination (60.3%) towards expecting similar support for Armenia.

The anticipation of Israeli support in a potential conflict was consistent across most age groups, exceeding 80%. However, this figure spiked to 93.3% among respondents aged 18-25 and reached 90.9% in the 36-45 age group.

Respondents in the 46-55 age group expressed the belief that Georgia would support Azerbaijan in the event of war.

Additionally, respondents in the 46-55 age group were more inclined to believe that Iran would support Armenia in a potential conflict, with 88.7% expressing this view compared to other age groups.

Compared to other occupational groups, 92.2% of those working in the private sector believe that Iran will support Armenia in a possible war. For public sector workers, unemployed and housewives, this figure is 89.5%, 79.2% and 68.5%, respectively.

Students are the group that most mentions that economic support will be provided to our country - 85.8%. More than 70% of those working with an individual labor contract, the unemployed and those working in the public sector say that economic support will be provided to our country. 59.4% of private sector employees have this opinion.

A certain expression of support for these parties in a state of war by a number of countries										
	Turkey	Ukraine	Pakistan	Israel	Georgia	Armenia	USA	Russia	France	Iran
Azerbaijan	99.8%	93.2%	99.6%	87.2%	71.0%	70.4%	17.7%	15.7%	1.8%	1.9%
Armenia	0.2%	6.8%	0.4%	12.8%	29.0%	29.6%	82.3%	84.3%	98.2%	98.1%

Main areas of support						
	Political	Military	Economical	Humanitarian	Informationally	In all directions
Azerbaijan	74.7%	69.2%	71.7%	74.5%	74.0%	87.5%
Armenia	67.3%	82.4%	67.7%	63.2%	70.0%	54.4%

*The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.*

Although the opinions of those who served on the front and rear lines of the First Karabakh War were close on the direction of support for Azerbaijan in a possible war, differences were observed in several directions. Thus, those who served on the front lines of the said war (78.9%) expect more economic support for our country than those who served on the rear lines (61.2%).

It is interesting that the expectation of Israel's support for our country is higher among the residents of the frontline area than among the residents of the non-frontline area - 94.4% and 84.3%. Support from Georgia to our country is more expected by people living in non-frontline regions than by residents of the frontline region (66.1%) - 74.5%. 77.5% of the residents of the frontline region and 67.8% of the non-frontline region residents expect economic support for our country. 81.1% of those living in the frontline area, and 70% of the other group said that they would provide more humanitarian support to Azerbaijan. Interestingly, although 82.2% of the residents of the war zone expect more information support for our country, this figure is 68.5% for the residents of the non-frontline area.

## 1.6. Factors determining the delay in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem

53.8% of respondents primarily attribute the delay in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to Russia's hindrance to the onset of war. As the second factor, 48.1% of respondents indi-

cate that major powers such as the USA, Russia, and France have an interest in perpetuating the problem. Additionally, 42.8% of respondents believe that the UN's failure to implement resolutions related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict contributes to the delay in its resolution.

Opinions regarding the factors causing the delay in conflict resolution vary across economic regions. For instance, in Upper Karabakh, a larger proportion of respondents (47%) believe that the non-implementation of UN resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a key factor delaying the solution. This figure stands at 35% for residents of Baku and 22.3% for those in Sheki-Zagatala.


Concerning the delay in resolving the issue, the option "Russia obstructing the initiation of war" is more favored by the population of Guba-Khachmaz (61.2%) and least favored by the population of Ganja-Gazakh (47.7%) compared to other regions. Indicators for the factor of other countries hindering Turkey's political and military support and thus delaying the solution of the problem are relatively high among the population of Guba-Khachmaz (22.3%). None of the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh Shirvan selected this option.

About 33.9% of private sector workers and 19.3% of respondents among housewives attribute the delay in conflict resolution to the strong activity of the Armenian diaspora abroad.

Opinions regarding external factors delaying the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem do not significantly differ by place of residence. Similarly, indicators for the option "Russia obstructing the onset of war" are almost uniform across all three social classes.

It's worth noting that although 53.8% of respondents attribute the delay to Russia's obstruction and 27.1% to the strong activity of the Armenian diaspora abroad, in reality, neither the Russian factor nor the Armenian diaspora's activity has been able to impede the processes.

Opinions on the factors delaying the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem are consistent across both groups, regardless of whether they served on the front or rear lines in the First Karabakh War. Similarly, opinions on the factors causing the delay do not significantly differ between frontline and non-frontline regions.



*The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.*



### 1.7. Expectations from the second Karabakh war

The evolving military-political landscape surrounding the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict necessitates a proactive evaluation of its perspectives.


A substantial majority, comprising 89.6% of respondents, anticipate the liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven surrounding regions with the onset of the Second Karabakh war. Additionally, 30.5% of respondents foresee the potential dissolution of the “defeated nation” syndrome through this conflict, with Azerbaijan’s victorious image emerging as a source of pride for citizens both inside and outside the country.

Among different employment groups, the belief in the liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding regions is more prevalent among the household population group (71.6%), while other groups exhibit similar opinions.

With the prospect of the Second Karabakh war, the idea of liberating Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding regions garners more support among the “upper” social class (70.4%), while the notion of dispelling the “defeated people” syndrome finds greater traction among the “lower” social class (32%). Respondents’ views on other critical aspects of conflict resolution do not significantly vary between social classes. Regarding age groups, although there were no substantial differences in responses to the question, the 18-25 age group showed a higher inclination (72.1%) towards the liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding regions. Similarly, individuals in this age group (35.6%) expressed a stronger belief in the disappearance of the “defeated nation” syndrome compared to other groups. Over 70% of the population in Upper Karabakh and Lankaran believe in the potential liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding regions if the Second Karabakh war commences, whereas for the population of Baku, this figure stands at 59.6%.

In response to the question, family members in military service are more likely to anticipate the liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding regions with the onset of the Second Karabakh War (71%). According to a survey conducted with internally displaced persons, a significant majority (93.8%) believe that all territories will be freed from occupation in the near future.

Opinions in response to the question do not differ significantly by place of residence.



*The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.*

73.2% of respondents from frontline regions and 62% from non-frontline regions anticipate the liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding regions with the commencement of the Second Karabakh War. Additionally, residents of frontline regions noted the potential disappearance of the “defeated nation” syndrome as a result of the war (32.3%). Among those who served on the front line in the First Karabakh War, there are more people who think that the “defeated nation” syndrome will disappear with the start of the Second Karabakh War than those who served on the rear front - 33.4% and 17.3%, respectively.

### 1.8. Important factors in terms of conflict resolution

Nearly half of the respondents (44.5%) deem it crucial to bolster Azerbaijan’s military strength in terms of conflict resolution. Regarding potential solutions, 42.9% suggest Azerbaijan engage in direct negotiations with Russia, while 37.4% advocate for expanding the network of foreign partners.

In terms of conflict resolution, those who prioritize ensuring that diplomacy, economy, social conditions, and healthcare adequately support the military numbered 28% among individuals with higher education and 16.2% among those with a complete secondary education.

Interestingly, individuals employed in the private sector deem initiating negotiations with the West more vital than the aforementioned aspect (19.6%). 28% of housewives emphasize the importance of further weakening Armenia militarily and politically for resolving the conflict, with private sector workers (9.8%) showing the lowest endorsement among employment groups. Students (59%) express a stronger preference than other groups for Azerbaijan to expand its net-

work of foreign partners to address the conflict. This sentiment was echoed by 41.3% of individuals engaged in household chores and 27.6% of those employed under individual contracts.

While there isn't much disparity among employment groups regarding the belief that a favorable geopolitical environment is crucial for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, only 18% of those under individual employment contracts selected this option, compared to 8.9% of pensioners.

There was no significant divergence in responses between economic regions for the options "Formation of a unified government-opposition platform" and "Ensuring quality coordination among government agencies."


One crucial aspect to highlight is that the dynamics shifted significantly following the Patriotic War. While before the conflict, a mere 20.2% of respondents favored the formation of a unified government-opposition platform for conflict resolution, the course of the war itself effectively transformed into a unifying platform for these previously opposing factions.

Overall, in the pre-war survey, 44.5% of the population deemed it vital to bolster Azerbaijan's military strength for conflict resolution. However, the sheer scale and intensity of the counter-offensive operations decisively shattered all preconceived notions about the strength and proficiency of the army.


Examining the points reflecting the significance of conflict resolution, we observe a no-

table discrepancy in one aspect: the belief that achieving a favorable geopolitical situation is essential. This conclusion is favored twice as much by the refugee population compared to non-refugees, at 26.7% and 12% respectively.

Opinions from various social strata and individuals who served on the front and rear lines of the First Karabakh war do not significantly differ regarding the crucial factors for conflict resolution.



The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.



## “MILITARY-POLITICAL” BLOCK

### SECTION II. PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS AZERBAIJAN ARMY’S RESPONSE TO ARMENIAN PROVOCATIONS

The escalation of Armenian armed forces provocations along the Azerbaijani-Armenian state border zone, particularly in the Gazakh-Tovuz and Nakhchivan directions, has underscored the pressing need for a military resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the near future. Following the Tovuz clashes on July 12, the subsequent unfolding of events, marked by their military nature, heightened the significance of Azerbaijan’s struggle for territorial integrity. Prior to the events of July 12, President Ilham Aliyev’s unequivocal declaration regarding Armenia’s unacceptable mimicry of negotiations amidst clear military provocations against Azerbaijan, amid global silence, demonstrated a prescient and rational foreign policy strategy. This strategy involved comprehensive preparation and included the prospect of a military solution to the conflict.

#### 2.1. Public attitude to our army’s response to Tovuz provocation by Armenians

69.8% of respondents believe that the Azerbaijani army demonstrated its superiority over the Armenian army by retaliating against Armenian armed forces provocations. Additionally, 61.8% stated that our army effectively thwarted enemy provocations in a timely manner, while 59.6% expressed confidence in its ability to independently defeat the enemy in war. These findings underscore the significant outcomes achieved through the Azerbaijani army’s intensive military operations for territorial integrity.


An analysis of respondents’ views on the Azerbaijani army’s retaliatory actions against Armenian provocations revealed several noteworthy trends. Notably, 81.4% of individuals with incomplete higher education, 70.8% with complete secondary education, and 65.5% with higher education believe that the Azerbaijani army showcased its strength in responding to Armenian provocations.

While options such as “The need for further army reinforcement” and “Enhancing military professionalism” garnered relatively lower responses across all groups, indicating high pub-



How do you evaluate the response of the Azerbaijani army to the provocation of the Armenian armed forces?

- 1 Our army proved to be stronger than the Armenian army
- 2 Our army was able to prevent enemy provocation in time
- 3 Our army has shown that it is capable of defeating the enemy on its own in the war
- 4 Our army once again inflicted a psychological defeat on the enemy
- 5 There is a need to increase the professionalism of servicemen in the army
- 6 It became clear that there is a need to further strengthen the army
- 7 Other
- 8 DTA



*The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.*

lic appreciation for the strength and professionalism of Azerbaijani servicemen.

Age groups showed no significant discrepancy regarding the Azerbaijani army’s response to Armenian provocations.

Regional analysis regarding the belief in our army’s capability to defeat the enemy alone in war indicates that 76.4% of Guba-Khachmaz residents and 55.4% of Upper Karabakh residents share this perspective, with other economic regions falling in between.

29.6% of respondents highlighted that our army once again inflicted psychological defeat on the enemy, with 43.4% of Upper Karabakh respondents sharing this sentiment.

While 85.5% of Nagorno-Karabakh respondents and 65.8% of Ganja-Gazakh respondents noted our army’s timely prevention of enemy provocations, only 43.9% of Absheron residents shared this view.

Regarding the belief that “Our army proved stronger than the Armenian army,” 84% of Lankaran residents, 50.7% of Absheron residents, and 66.5% of Upper Karabakh residents chose this option.

Regarding the Azerbaijani army’s retaliatory

strike against Armenian armed forces provocations, respondents' opinions remain consistent across all three places of residence.

While respondents' views on the Azerbaijani army's retaliatory strike against Armenian provocations did not vary by social class, individuals from the "middle" class (63.5%) relatively emphasized our army's ability to timely prevent enemy provocations. Among those from the "low" class, only 26.9% (or 89 people) stated the need to enhance military personnel professionalism in the army.

"When assessing the Azerbaijani army's response to Armenian armed forces provocations," regardless of their involvement in the first Karabakh war, both groups provided nearly identical answer options.

Opinions regarding the Azerbaijani army's retaliatory actions against Armenian provocations show little variance between refugee and non-refugee populations. Specifically, 41.6% of individuals with refugee status and 27.8% of non-refugees chose the option "Our army once again inflicted a psychological defeat on the enemy."

Concerning the Azerbaijani army's retaliatory response to Armenian provocations, 78.5% of individuals who served on the rear front in the First Karabakh War believe our army proved stronger than the Armenian army, compared to 68.7% of those who served on the front line.

Analysis of opinions regarding the Azerbaijani Army's response to Armenian provocations indicates that residents in conflict areas believe our army effectively thwarted enemy provocations in a timely manner (64.5% and 59.9%) and demonstrated superiority over the Armenian army (70.3% and 69.4%), as well as exhibiting capability to independently defeat the enemy in war (60.7% and 58.9%) more than residents in non-frontline regions.

## 2.2. The reasons for Armenia's attack on the border with Azerbaijan

While 56.8% of respondents link Armenia's assault on the border with Azerbaijan in the Tovuz region to the enemy's aim of targeting international projects in the area (such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars), 46.2% believe Armenia deliberately provoked Azerbaijan. Respondents also perceive Armenia's attempt to compensate for the April defeat (29.9%) as a motive behind the Tovuz provoca-


tion.

Among students, 37.6% attribute the enemy's attack in the Tovuz region to Armenia's intention to involve a third party in the conflict, while this percentage is 20.2% among state employees.

Interestingly, while 67.6% of the Ganja-Kazakh population believes Armenia seeks to target international projects in the region, this figure is 46% in Baku, and 20.9% in Nagorno-Karabakh Shirvan.

Regarding the primary motives for Armenia's assault on the border with Azerbaijan in the Tovuz region, respondents' opinions remain consistent regardless of social class, participation in the First Karabakh war, and refugee status.

Differences among age groups emerge regarding the reasons for Armenia's attack in the Tovuz region. More than 35% of the 18-25 and 26-35 age groups attribute the assault to Armenia's desire to compensate for the April defeat. In contrast, 56.2% of 56-65-year-olds and 60.8% of those over 65 emphasize Armenia's aim to target international projects in the region through the Tovuz provocation. The belief that Armenia seeks to compensate for the April defeat by attacking in the Tovuz region is more



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prevalent among non-participants in the war (31.8%) compared to those who took part in the first Karabakh conflict (20.9%).

### 2.3. Changes that the current situation will lead to in solving the problem

Almost half of the respondents (46.5%) believe that a military resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is inevitable, given the circumstances following the Tovuz battles. Among the expected changes, 35.5% foresee a geopolitical isolation-induced political crisis in Armenia leading to its military failure, aligning with the current situation in the country.


The consensus on the inevitability of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue militarily surpasses 40% across all education levels, notably reaching 50.2% among those with higher education.

Interestingly, among occupational groups, a higher proportion of public sector workers (40.2%) anticipate Armenia's geopolitical isolation leading to a political crisis and military failure. On the other hand, more students (39.3%) foresee a shift due to Armenia's weakening, while only 21% of private sector employees share this view.

Respondents from the "upper" class (34%) are more inclined to believe that Russia's political support for Armenia will decrease under current conditions compared to those from the "lower" class (23.9%). A similar contrast exists between these groups (34.8% and 22.4%) regarding the perception of new developments amid Armenia's weakening.

Analyzing responses to the question "What positive changes can the current situation lead to in solving the problem?" reveals that respondents from Ganja-Kazakh (51.8%) and Upper Karabakh (50.8%) are more inclined to view military resolution as inevitable. Conversely, the lowest percentage for this option was recorded in Lankaran (22.7%), with only 27 respondents holding this view among those from this economic region.

Responses to "What positive changes can the current conditions lead to in solving the problem?" do not significantly differ across various demographic groups, including participants and non-participants in the First Karabakh War, military personnel and civilians, residents of frontline and non-frontline areas, refugees, and non-refugees, as well as different age groups.



*The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.*

### 2.4. The historical opportunity in the current situation for resolving the conflict


72% of respondents (52.3% "completely agree", 19.7% "mostly agree") evaluate the current situation as a historical opportunity to solve the problem to one degree or another.

The general indicator of those who agree to one or another degree that the current situation is a historical opportunity to solve the problem is more in Nagorno-Shirvan (91.7%), and significantly less in Absheron (69.9%) and Lankaran (53%). Among those who disagree with this opinion to varying degrees, Lankaran is in the first position - 32%. In other words, among the respondents from this economic region, 38 people disagreed with the stated opinion to one degree or another.

Among those who evaluated the current situation as a historical opportunity to solve the problem, similar results were obtained by age groups.

Those with family members in military service (58.3% "completely agree" and 18.7% "mostly agree") agree to one degree or another with the idea that the current situation is a historical opportunity to solve the problem, compared to the other group. Those who do not agree with this opinion to varying degrees are more among non-military than family members (18% "not at all agree", 6.3% "mostly disagree").

Among the refugee and non-refugee population, the indicators of those who agree to one or another degree with the idea that the current situation is a historical opportunity to solve the problem do not differ significantly.



*The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.*

## 2.5. An offensive position in Nagorno-Karabakh and other fronts as a response to the Tovuz provocation by the enemy

"Should the Azerbaijani army retaliate against Nagorno-Karabakh and other fronts following the enemy's provocation in Tovuz?" 79.4% of respondents answered affirmatively.


Although there isn't a significant gender disparity in the belief that the Azerbaijani army should respond to the enemy's provocation in Tovuz by attacking Nagorno-Karabakh and other fronts, men (81.8%) are slightly more inclined towards this stance compared to women (76.9%).

Opinions on whether the Azerbaijani army should retaliate against Nagorno-Karabakh and other fronts in response to the Tovuz provocation are fairly consistent among different demographic groups.

A considerable proportion of all three social classes ("upper" class 84.8%, "middle" class 80%, "lower" class 75.6%) responded positively to the question of whether the Azerbaijani army should attack Nagorno-Karabakh and other fronts following the enemy's Tovuz provocation.

While attitudes towards the Azerbaijani army's offensive response to the Tovuz provocation in Nagorno-Karabakh and other fronts are generally similar across age groups (with over 70% of all age groups answering "yes"), the 36-45 age group exhibits relatively higher support, with 83.4% in favor.

Regardless of their involvement in the First Karabakh War or whether they have family members in military service, both groups express equal desire for the Azerbaijani army to retaliate against Nagorno-Karabakh and other fronts in response to the Tovuz provocation.




## 2.6. How threatened would you feel during a war?

A significant portion of the population (78.1%) expressed varying degrees of safety during the war, with 49.9% feeling "completely safe" and 28.2% feeling "partially safe." Men (83.3%) and women (72.8%) exhibited differing levels of assurance during wartime, with a higher percentage of men feeling secure.

Among age groups, those aged 18-25 (82.4%) and 26-35 (84.7%) expressed a stronger sense of safety during war compared to other demographics. Non-refugees (79.2%) generally felt safer during wartime than refugees (71.5%), while individuals residing far from conflict zones (79.6%) reported feeling safer to some extent compared to those living in front zones (76%).

Both the "upper" and "middle" classes demonstrated similar safety perceptions during war, with 79.7% feeling secure to some extent. Interestingly, a larger percentage of the "upper" class (60.2%) felt completely safe during wartime compared to the "middle" (50.2%) and "lower" classes (45%).

Regional analysis revealed varying perceptions of safety during war, with populations in Baku (80.3%) and Absheron (85%) expressing higher levels of security. Conversely, residents of Sheki-Zagatala (82%) and Upper Karabakh (75.5%) reported slightly lower feelings of safety. Respondents from Lankaran (66.4%) expressed the lowest sense of security during wartime compared to other regions.



## 2.7. Would you/your family members go to the front to participate in the war?

91.2% of respondents, when asked if they or their family members would go to the front to participate in the war, answered with a resounding “yes.” Notably, a vast majority of both men (96.8%) and women (85.5%) expressed willingness to join the front lines. Across all age groups, the sentiment towards participating in the war was overwhelmingly positive, with more than 90% indicating their readiness to do so. While there was a slightly lower percentage among those over 65 (88.1%), this figure remains notably high for this age category.

It’s worth highlighting that over 55,000 individuals volunteered to join the army and partake in the battle for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity following the call from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Ilham Aliyev, before the Patriotic War.

Interestingly, opinions on this matter did not significantly vary across education levels, occupational groups, or other categories, indicating a unified stance among the populace towards participation in defense efforts.

## 2.8. The role of the political system in restoring the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan

The history of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transcends mere statistical figures, unfolding through various stages of development with a complexity and contradiction that defy simple resolution. Beyond the loss of land, the conflict embodies profound historical trials for the Azerbaijani people, bearing the painful scars of occupation on their ancient lands. Hence, the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict heralds not just a territorial return but also the dawn of a new socio-political era, not only for Azerbaijan but for the entire region.

In a survey, 73.1% of respondents underscored the importance of people-presidential


unity, while 52.1% emphasized the significance of Azerbaijan’s robust military policy and the strength of its armed forces in reclaiming territories lost in the First Karabakh War and subsequent battles.

While gender differences weren’t significant in opinions regarding these factors, interestingly, the option of Azerbaijan’s strong military policy garnered slightly more support among women (55.6%) compared to men (49%).

Demographic indicators also highlighted varying perspectives on the factors contributing to the return of lost lands. For instance, the rural population (41.5%) primarily emphasized the role of people-presidential unity, while a majority (54.3%) pointed to the importance of Azerbaijan’s military policy.

In terms of socioeconomic status, while 40.7% of respondents from the “upper” class attributed the return of lost lands to Azerbaijan’s strong domestic and foreign policies, only 25.4% of those from the “lower” class shared this view.

Among the 18-25 age group, 60.1% attribute the return of Azerbaijan’s lost lands in the First Karabakh War to the recent battles and the nation’s robust military policy. In contrast, this figure stands at 44.5% for the 56-65 age group.



*The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.*

2.9. Public attitude towards Russia’s position regarding the Tovuz provocation


Regarding Russia’s stance on the provocation by Armenians in the Tovuz region, 86.6% of respondents believe that Russia’s primary interest lies in its military base in Armenia. Additionally, 73.3% associate Russia’s known position with its reluctance to confront Turkey in this conflict.

When analyzing Russia’s stance on the Tovuz provocation, it’s noteworthy that 70.7% of respondents with incomplete secondary education and 56.6% with higher education perceive Russia’s actions as a response to the anti-Russian sentiment prevalent in Armenia. Conversely, among those with higher education, 33.9% hold the opposite view.

Interestingly, more than 40% of respondents across all educational levels believe that Armenia is no longer of significant interest to Russia. However, among those who disagree, individuals with higher education constitute the majority at 54%.

In terms of residential areas, over 60% of respondents in settlements and villages believe that Russia’s behavior is influenced by the anti-Russian atmosphere in Armenia. In contrast, among the urban population, this figure stands at 55.5%.

Furthermore, more than 60% of urban residents answered affirmatively to the statement “Russia does not trust Azerbaijan as a partner.” Notably, more than 80% of respondents across all three social classes agree that Russia is primarily interested in its military base in Armenia.







## “LEGAL-POLITICAL” BLOCK

### SECTION III. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS IN THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION

For nearly three decades, the responsibility of achieving a peaceful resolution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a significant impediment to lasting peace in the South Caucasus and the region's development, has rested with the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group—comprising Russia, the USA, and France—key players in global geopolitics.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) supports a political settlement based on the principles outlined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, facilitated by the OSCE Minsk Group. Despite numerous resolutions, including No. 1119 and 1416, addressing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the broader conflicts in the South Caucasus, Armenia has consistently exhibited a non-constructive stance, disregarding international law and existing agreements. Armenia's obstructionism has hindered progress toward a peaceful resolution, impeding constructive dialogue and negotiation efforts despite the principles outlined in the Madrid document of the OSCE Minsk Group in November 2007.


#### 3.1. The effect of the draft law on Nagorno-Karabakh in the US Congress on the resolution of the conflict

While 52.6% of respondents believe that the strictest bill in Congress recognizing the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh will positively influence the conflict's resolution, 32.2% hold the opposite view.

Both male and female respondents, constituting over 50% in each category, share the belief that this bill will have a positive impact, marking a significant sentiment across genders.

Among all three social classes, “positive” opinions regarding the bill's effect on conflict resolution are similar, exceeding 50% for both the “upper” and “middle” classes. However, the “lower” class shows slightly lower positivity at 46.9%. Negative opinions about the bill's impact are minimal across all social classes.

Interestingly, respondents from the “lower” class express a higher percentage (37.5%) of belief that the bill will have no effect on conflict resolution compared to those from the “upper”



class (28.9%).

In terms of refugee status, non-refugees are more inclined to view the bill positively, with 53.6% believing in its beneficial impact, compared to 46.5% among refugees.

Significantly, respondents from both frontline and non-frontline regions of Azerbaijan equally perceive the bill as having a positive impact on conflict resolution, marking a unified perspective irrespective of geographic location.

#### 3.2. Public attitude to the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group in conflict resolution

81.8% of the population evaluated the OSCE Minsk Group's activity in conflict settlement as “bad.” Notably, negative assessments are more prevalent among pensioners, with 80.3% expressing dissatisfaction.

Across different residential areas, 70.8% of urban residents, 66% of rural residents, and 63.5% of those living in settlements view the OSCE Minsk Group's activity unfavorably.


Age appears to influence attitudes towards the OSCE Minsk Group's activities, with negativity increasing as age rises. For instance, while 76.5% of the population aged 56-65 rate the group's activity poorly, this figure jumps to 83.3% among those over 65.

Participation in the first Karabakh war also impacts perceptions, as 83.3% of war veterans rate the OSCE Minsk Group's activity negatively, compared to 63.8% among non-participants.

Furthermore, among those who served on the front line during the first Karabakh war, 85% hold negative views of the OSCE Minsk Group's activity, while this figure stands at 77.5% for those who served on the rear front.

## 3.3. Confidence in the direct military support of the Turkish army to Azerbaijan in the event of a war


The absolute majority expressed confidence in the direct military support of the Turkish army to our country during the war. This indicator is 94.9%. Most of the respondents believe in the direct military support of the Turkish army to our country during the war because we are a friendly and brotherly country (90.8%). Those who do not believe in the direct military support of the Turkish army to our country associated it with Turkey's unwillingness to confront Russia (63.9%) and open an additional front (48.5%). All social classes believe in the direct military support of the



Turkish army to our country during the war at the same level - more than 90%. As for opinions on the motives of trust, the main difference determined by social classes is related to the option "Because of the personal friendship of the heads of state", which is more common among the "upper" class (31.4%). Among those who shared the opposite position, those from the "upper" class explained the reason for their lack of trust as Turkey's reluctance to open an additional front (66.7%), while those from the "lower" class mostly explained it as Turkey's unwillingness to face Russia (65.4%).

The absolute majority of people who participated in the first Karabakh war (92.9%) and those who did not participate (95.4%) believe that the Turkish army will provide direct military support to Azerbaijan during the war.

The absolute majority of those living in the frontline (96.3%) and non-frontline areas (93.9%) believe that the Turkish army will provide direct military support to our country during the war.



The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.

## 3.4. Supporting military-political conditions with personnel reforms

Azerbaijan is strategically pursuing rational and pragmatic measures towards the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a cornerstone of its independent foreign policy strategy aimed at safeguarding national, military, territorial, and geopolitical security. These efforts involve comprehensive reforms mobilizing all available resources, including military preparations, to address the conflict within the framework of international law.

An overwhelming 87.6% of respondents positively evaluated the personnel reforms initiated by the President within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reflecting broad support for these initiatives.

Interestingly, opinions regarding these reforms remain consistent across different educational backgrounds and genders.

In the region of Guba-Khachmaz, 93% of respondents expressed varying degrees of approval for the personnel reforms, while in Baku,

this figure stood at 79%.

While both the “upper” (89%) and “middle” classes (89.3%) showed similar levels of approval for the reforms, the “lower” class exhibited a slightly lower percentage at 78.9%.

Participation in the first Karabakh war did not significantly influence opinions on the personnel reforms, with similar indicators observed across both groups.

Similarly, regardless of refugee status, the majority of respondents expressed approval for the reforms, with 91.3% of refugees and 87.2% of non-refugees endorsing them.

Among both military and non-military family members, a majority evaluated the personnel reforms positively.


Notably, residents of frontline regions displayed a higher inclination towards rating the personnel reforms as “very good” compared to those in non-frontline areas, with figures at 68.4% and 60.8%, respectively.

### 3.5. Effects of new appointments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy

In terms of the anticipated impact of new appointments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, 43.3% believe it will bolster the country’s international reputation, while 32.1% expect a positive influence on the military-political dynamics in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, leading to a more active, systematic, and flexible approach by the Ministry. Additionally, 29.7% foresee alignment with global challenges.


Opinions on the anticipated changes in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy due to these appointments do not vary significantly based on education or gender.

Examining perspectives on the Ministry’s activity post-appointments, similar percentages of respondents in Nagorno-Shirvan and Guba-Khachmaz regions—48% and 47.3%, respectively—expect a more active, systematic, and flexible approach in line with international challenges.



While 33.8% of the “middle” class anticipate positive effects on the Nagorno-Karabakh front, only 23.8% of the “upper” class share this view. Conversely, 52.6% of the “upper” class and 34.8% of the “lower” class foresee an enhancement of Azerbaijan’s international reputation due to these changes.

Consistent results were observed across all age groups regarding evaluations of personnel reforms within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suggesting a uniform perception of these reforms regardless of age.



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## “HUMANITARIAN” BLOCK

### SECTION IV. PUBLIC RELATION TO JULY 14 NATIONAL SOLIDARITY DEMONSTRATION

The march in support of the army in Baku on the night of July 14-15 showcased once again the unwavering determination of the Azerbaijani people to reclaim their territorial integrity, refusing to yield even an inch to the enemy. International military history underscores that alongside military prowess, societal patriotism plays a pivotal role in restoring a nation's territorial integrity during times of conflict. The national solidarity demonstration on July 14th exemplified this synergy, marking a profound moment of political and moral ascendancy for Azerbaijan. It stands as a testament to the seamless unity between the populace, the state, and the armed forces, underscoring their collective resolve.

#### 4.1. Public support for the state and army of Azerbaijan during Tovuz operations

During active military operations in Tovuz, more than half of the population showed support for the state of Azerbaijan (48.4%) and its army (48.6%). 51.6% do not show support for the state, 51.4% do not show support for the army.

Compared to women, during the active military operations in Tovuz, men showed more support for the Azerbaijani army (men 59%, women 37.8%) and the state (men 58.6%, women 37.6%).

During active military operations in Tovuz, people with higher education showed more support for the Azerbaijani state (57.3%) and army (59%) than other groups.

During active military operations in Tovuz, pensioners (38.5% for the state and 38.8% for the army) and housewives (33.8% for the state and 31.5% for the army) showed the least support for the state and army of Azerbaijan among the occupational groups.

The 18-25 (56.7%) and 26-35 age groups (57.8%) were the majority among those who showed support for the state of Azerbaijan.


Respondents from Sheki Zagatala and Nagorno Shirvan (70.9%) showed more support for the state of Azerbaijan during operations.

During active military operations in Tovuz, compared to family members who were not in military service, more support was shown for the state of Azerbaijan (53.8%, 47.3%) and the army (56% and 47.2%).

During active military operations in Tovuz, people who participated in the First Karabakh War showed more support for the state of Azerbaijan (53.2%, 47.5%) and its army (55.8%, 47.3%) than those who did not participate in the war.

People who served on the front line in the First Karabakh War showed more support for the Azerbaijani state (55.7% and 45.2%) and army (59.7% and 43%) during active military operations in Tovuz, regardless of their position.

The non-refugee population showed more support for the Azerbaijani state (49.5% and 41%) and army (48.9% and 47%) during the active military operations in Tovuz than the refugees.



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During the active military operations in Tovuz, no sharp difference was observed between the indicators of those who supported the Azerbaijani state and its army from the front and non-front areas.

#### 4.2. Forms of support for active military operations in Tovuz

57.2% of the population expressed patriotic sentiments on social networks, with 34.8% actively defending our state against Armenians in online discussions. An analysis of support forms from a gender perspective revealed notable disparities. For instance, women exhibited a higher inclination towards patriotic expressions on social media (68.8%) compared to men (50%). Moreover, while 31.4% of men participated in the burial of martyrs, only 18.2% of women did so. However, reasons for not showing support for the state and army were similar across both genders.

Among supporters, those with higher education (65.4%) and those with complete secondary education (51.3%) were the most active in expressing patriotic views on social media. Interestingly, 44.3% of housewives engaged in defending our state against Armenians online. Of these, 40.7% had higher education, while 28.6% held vocational or college degrees.

Individuals with higher education showed a higher propensity to volunteer for military service (18.6%) compared to those with incomplete secondary education (6.5%). Similarly, a larger proportion of respondents with higher education (14.8%) signed petitions supporting Nagorno-Karabakh compared to those with complete secondary education (4.3%).

During active military operations in Tovuz, reasons for not showing support included adherence to quarantine rules, with 57.8% of respondents with incomplete secondary education and 47.5% of those with complete secondary education citing this reason. Students were particularly active in expressing patriotic sentiments online (83.8%), followed by housewives (71.8%) and public sector employees (63.9%).

Pensioners were also notable contributors to patriotic causes, with 37.8% expressing support on social networks, 28.8% defending our state online, and 27.6% providing food aid to soldiers. Among reasons for not showing support, compliance with quarantine rules was prominent, especially among those engaged in household chores (58.4%) and retirees (35.9%).

Regional disparities were evident in support indicators. For instance, 87.9% of the popula-

tion in Guba-Khachmaz expressed patriotic views on social media, whereas only 45.5% in Ganja-Kazakh did so. Similarly, 63.7% of Guba-Khachmaz residents defended our state online, compared to 53.3% in Lankaran. Nagorno-Shirvan and Sheki-Zagatala had the lowest levels of online defense (8.9% and 2%, respectively). Regarding food aid to soldiers, Ganja-Kazakh (36.7%), Upper Karabakh (35%), and Aran (31.9%) were the top contributors.

The responses to the query "In what form did you show support to the state and army of Azerbaijan?" indicate distinct trends between urban and rural populations. Notably, urban dwellers demonstrated a higher propensity for sharing patriotic sentiments on social networks, with 59.3% expressing such views compared to 42.7% among town residents. Similarly, in the realm of online defense against Armenians, urbanites surpassed their rural counterparts, constituting 39.8% versus 21.4%, respectively. Regarding food assistance to soldiers, rural areas showed greater involvement, with 30.4% contributing, whereas only 6.6% of town residents and 18.3% of urbanites engaged in this form of support.

The primary reasons cited by those abstaining from supporting the state and army were compliance with quarantine rules (48.5%) and personal circumstances (28.8%). Interestingly, urbanites faced more limitations due to personal conditions (37.4%) compared to rural residents (25.7%). Regarding adherence to quarantine rules, settlement residents (55.4%) outnumbered city dwellers (45.3%).

Analyzing support forms across social classes revealed disparities, particularly in food aid provision to soldiers. The "upper" class accounted for 36.3% of such assistance, contrasting with 23.7% from the "lower" class.

Examining support forms in relation to participation in the First Karabakh War unveiled noteworthy patterns. Those who did not participate in the conflict (61%) exhibited a higher tendency to express patriotic sentiments on social networks compared to war veterans (40.7%). Conversely, veterans were more inclined to provide food aid to soldiers (36.7%) than non-participants (23.9%).

Geographical factors also influenced support actions. Frontline region residents were more active in providing food aid to soldiers (42.9%) compared to non-frontline areas (15.2%). Conversely, those living far from conflict zones participated more in the burial of martyrs (32%) than their frontline counterparts (17.6%).

## 4.3. Public attitude to the people's march in support of the state and the Commander-in-Chief

Among the respondents, 59.3% perceived the people's march in support of the state and the Commander-in-Chief as a demonstration of support for the army, while 53.1% saw it as a symbol of unity against the enemy, and 52.5% viewed it as an expression of the unity of the people, army, and state. Notably, women consistently displayed high levels of agreement across all options.

While there were no significant differences in the evaluation of the support march among participants from various demographics, notable variations emerged. For instance, 53.9% of pensioners and 36% of the unemployed emphasized "Unity with the state," while 62.6% of students, 48.9% of those in the private sector, and 38.7% of the unemployed highlighted the concept of people-army-state unity.

Regional perspectives also shed light on differing opinions. For those believing the support march demonstrated backing for the army, the people of Aran ranked highest (59.5%), while those in Nagorno-Karabakh ranked lowest (64.6%). Residents of Lankaran (60.6%) were more inclined to perceive unity among the people, army, and state compared to respondents from Absheron (38.4%). Additionally, residents of Guba-Khachmaz (45.9%) saw the march as a statement of readiness for war to the international community, contrasting sharply with those in Nagorno-Karabakh (8.4%). Furthermore, 61.2% of Guba-Khachmaz residents, 31.3% of Nagorno-Shirvan residents, and 47.6% of Upper Karabakh residents believed the march showcased national unity against the enemy.

Regarding urban-rural distinctions, 60.8% of city dwellers and 50.8% of rural residents noted the

march as a demonstration of support for the army. However, the perception of people-army-state unity was less common among the "lower" class (43.6%) compared to the "upper" class (57.7%).


Interestingly, there were no significant differences in opinions across age groups regarding the assessment of the people's support for the state and the Commander-in-Chief.

## 4.4. The goals of a group of people who entered the parliament by force at the end of the July 14 march


At the conclusion of the July 14 march, 24% of respondents identified the police-citizen conflict as the primary objective behind a group entering the parliament, while 22.7% believed it aimed to challenge the 90s scenario by instigating unrest within the government. Interestingly, there were no discernible differences between male and female respondents regarding their perceptions of these goals.

Likewise, across all age groups, there were no significant differences in opinions regarding the motivations behind the group's entry into the parliament following the July 14 march.

However, opinions varied by economic region. For instance, 31.3% of respondents from Nagorno-Shirvan believed the goal was to damage the people's trust in the army, whereas only 21.8% of those from Ganja-Kazakh shared this view. The lowest indicator was observed in Sheki-Zagatala, with only 4.2% of respondents holding this opinion.



The total percentage of responses received is different from 100% because respondents were given the opportunity to select several options.



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## “INFO” BLOCK

### SECTION V. PRIMARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR

Studying the primary sources of information and assessing their reliability in times of war is crucial for two main reasons. Firstly, this research provides a foundation for comparative analyses in both military and peacetime contexts. Secondly, it offers insights that can support the state's information policy.

#### 5.1. Television as the main source of information

Television plays a significant role in providing information about the war, with 78.9% of the population relying on it for updates about the frontlines. The reliance on television differs between genders, with 83.5% of women and 74.7% of men turning to this medium for war-related news.

Education also plays a role in television's popularity. While 73% of those with higher education get their information from television, the figure rises to 83.8% for vocational-specialization/college graduates and peaks at 93.4% for those without formal education.

Occupational background influences television use too. Over 80% of retirees, housewives, and housekeepers rely on television for war

updates. Public sector employees and the unemployed show slightly lower rates, at 78% and 70.9% respectively.

Age has a significant impact on media consumption habits. Those over 65 are the most reliant on television, with 90.3% using it to follow war news. The 56-65 age group follows with an 86.3% rate. As age increases, television use rises while the Internet's use declines.

Geographical location also affects reliance on television. In rural areas, 83.2% of the population get their information from television, compared to 68.9% in urban areas. Regional variations are notable: Aran has the highest rate of television use for war news at 92%, followed by Ganja-Kazakh and Upper Karabakh, with rates above 80%. However, Baku has a lower rate of 61.2%, and Nagorno-Karabakh has the lowest rate at 50%.


There are similarities in television use among those who served on the front and rear fronts during the First Karabakh War. 86% of those with refugee status rely on television for information about the war, compared to 77.9% of those without refugee status. Similarly, 84% of military personnel and 77.9% of non-military personnel get their war news from television, mainly from family members.

According to the “Azerbaijan's Media Barometer” report by the Social Research Center, television (85.5%) is the main source of information among citizens. Websites (35.3%) and social networks (25.8%) follow television in terms of importance as sources of information.

#### 5.2. TV channels

Khazar TV is the most popular television channel during the war, with 77% of the population getting frontline information mainly from this source. Among Khazar TV viewers, there's a noticeable difference between the rural and urban populations, with 79.5% of rural residents and 69.6% of urban residents relying on this channel for news.

ATV holds the second position, with 58.9% of the population turning to it for frontline news. AzTV comes in third, with 46.7% of the population watching it. AzTV is particularly popular



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among public sector workers, with 51.3% of them choosing this channel for their war updates.

Following AzTV, Real TV (36.8%), ITV (26%), and Space TV (23.3%) are also significant sources of war-related information.

On July 12, 2020, during the battles along the Tavush border and Tovuz region of the Armenia-Azerbaijan state border, television channels played a key role in supporting the state's information campaign. This importance grew during the 44-day Patriotic War to liberate Azerbaijani lands from Armenian occupation, as limited internet access reduced the impact of social networks. As a result, television became more central to the state's information policy, with TV channels dedicating much of their airtime to war-related content. This focus on comprehensive war coverage likely boosted their ratings.

During the war, respondents from Lankaran reported receiving more frontline information from AzTV than other regions, with a rate of 64.3%. Around 49% of AzTV's audience is from Guba-Khachmaz. In contrast, the populations of Absheron (87.9%) and Guba-Khachmaz (87.3%) predominantly watch Khazar TV for

frontline news. ATV is particularly influential in providing information to residents of Upper Karabakh (64.4%) and Guba-Khachmaz (69%).

Regarding age groups, state television is most popular among those aged 46-55 (53.3%) and 56-65 (53.5%). ATV attracts more viewers among the 26-35 (63.3%) and over-65 age groups (62.4%). While Khazar TV has a consistent audience across all age groups, it's particularly popular among the 18-25 age group, with 80.6% relying on it for war-related news.

In terms of education, vocational/college graduates (50.2%) and those with higher education (50.6%) tend to follow AzTV more often. The indicators for ATV viewers with complete secondary education and higher education are similar, at 59.2% and 59%. Although Khazar TV has a broad appeal, 82% of those with incomplete secondary education and 69.4% of those with higher education turn to it for frontline information.



Among Internet-based TV channels, Meydan TV and Kanal 13 both have a viewership rate of 36.8%, while APA TV ranks third with 29.2%.

## 5.3. Reliability ratings to television channels


83.4% of respondents express greater trust in information they receive from television. This sentiment is more pronounced among women (87.5%) compared to men (79.7%).

While trust in television remains high across all education levels (over 80%), vocational-specialization/college graduates exhibit a slightly higher trust rate at 87.6%.

When examining occupational groups, those working in the public sector, pensioners, and housewives show a greater degree of trust in television, with over 80% expressing confidence in this source of information. In contrast, only 69.2% of those in the private sector share



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this level of trust.

The rural population shows higher levels of trust in television, with 86.7% indicating they rely on it to varying degrees for frontline news. This is noticeably higher than the urban population, where only 74.4% trust television. Consequently, a significant portion of urban residents (21.5%) report that they do not trust the information they receive from television to varying degrees.

The degree of trust in television for wartime information tends to increase with age. All age groups report trusting the information they receive about the war from television to some extent.

People who identify as part of the “upper” class generally exhibit a high degree of trust in television during wartime, with 91.6% trusting it to varying degrees and 73.2% expressing full trust. Among those getting frontline news from television, 59.4% of the “upper” class, 49.6% of the “middle” class, and 33.9% of the “lower” class express complete trust in this source.

Geographical factors also play a role in trust levels. Residents of Upper Karabakh have high trust in television, with 90% indicating they trust the information they receive to varying degrees. Conversely, residents of Sheki-Zagatala have the lowest trust in television, with only 62.6% expressing some level of trust.

Regarding the First Karabakh War, those who served on the front and rear fronts showed similar levels of trust in television for frontline news, indicating that experiences from that period might shape their current trust levels.

Location is also a significant factor. People from the frontline region are more likely to trust television to varying degrees (88.9%) compared to those from non-frontline regions (79.6%).

The Social Research Center’s “Azerbaijan’s Media Barometer” report shows that a significant majority of respondents (84.1%) even trusted the information from television during peacetime more than other mass media sources.

#### 5.4. Social networks

Social networks are the second most popular source of information about the frontlines, with 47.2% of the population relying on them. The

proportion of women (42.3%) and men (47%) who use social networks for news is relatively close.

When looking at educational background, 57.3% of those with higher education and 44.6% of those with complete secondary education get their information from social networks. Geographically, the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, Shirvan (79.2%), and Absheron (76.8%) are the most likely to use social networks for news. However,


other regions have lower rates, with Shaki Zagatala at 63.9%, Lankaran at 52.2%, Ganja-Gazakh at 45.2%, and Upper Karabakh at 34.9%.

People who use social networks for information about the front do so regardless of whether they live in a city, town, or village. The younger demographic, especially those aged 18-25 (73.8%) and 26-35 (65.5%), are more likely to rely on social networks for frontline news. As age decreases, social networks’ use increases, while television’s use declines.

Facebook is the most popular social network, with 58.4% using it to get frontline news. During the First Karabakh War, 46.3% of those who served on the front line and 30.8% of those on the rear front used Facebook for news. A notable difference is observed between refugees and non-refugees, with 50% of refugees and 37.9% of non-refugees getting frontline news from Facebook.

YouTube ranks second among social networks, with 38.9% of the population watching it for news. There is no significant gender difference among YouTube users. However, class differences are apparent—71% of those in the “upper” class use YouTube for frontline news, compared to 57.9% of the “middle” class and 56.5% of the “lower” class. In rural areas, 62.7% use YouTube to watch frontline news, compared to 50.6% of city residents and 40% of settlement residents. Among those living in frontline regions, 65.6% use YouTube, while those in non-frontline regions do so at a rate of 54.7%.

While people living in Sheki-Zagatala get information about what is happening on the



front during the war relatively more from Facebook (54.4%), YouTube is more specific for the Gazakh population of Guba-Khachmaz and Ganja (63.7%) and (63.9%).

Instagram ranks third with 37.5%. Interestingly, while 43.5% of women turn to Instagram, 30% get their frontline information from Facebook. Unlike representatives of the opposite sex, men get their frontline news more from Facebook (47.5%) than from Instagram (31.9%). In order to obtain information about the processes taking place at the front, more township residents turn to Instagram, and they also dominate the rural population - 51.7% and 35.2%.

### 5.5. The degree of reliability of social networks

44.3% of respondents have varying degrees of trust in the frontline news they get from social networks.

The level of trust in frontline news from social networks depends on proximity to the conflict zone. Those who live far from the conflict zone tend to trust social media-based frontline news more, with a trust rate of 49.3% compared to 37.2% for those who live closer to the conflict zone.

In general, there is no significant demographic variation among those who obtain frontline information from social networks during the war.

### 5.6. People around

After television and social networks, the third main source of information for the population in war conditions is the people around them (17.8%).

There is no significant difference between women and men who get information from this source.

Those who turn to the people around them as a source of information are relatively more widespread among those with incomplete secondary education (30.7%) compared to those with higher education (16.5%).

35.9% of respondents trust the information they receive from people around them to one degree or another.


### 5.7. Comparison of social networks and television

58.8% of respondents agreed with the opinion that "social networks provide information about what is happening on the front more quickly than television." A statistically significant relationship ( $X^2(10)=284.869$ ,  $p<0.01$ ) was

found between this opinion and the sources of information. Specifically, among those who rely on social networks for news, 66.1% agreed with the statement, while 71.1% of television viewers also believed that social networks are quicker. The majority of those who agreed with this opinion were found within these two groups, highlighting a notable contrast with other groups.

For further insight, among those who primarily get their news from social networks (like YouTube, Instagram, and Facebook), 66.1% agreed with this opinion, while 32.4% disagreed, indicating some variation in perspectives. Similarly, among those who did not agree with the statement that "social networks provide information about what is happening on the front more quickly than television," 32.4% obtained their news mainly from social networks, while 86.7% used television. This again underscores that the majority of dissenting opinions are concentrated in these two groups, with significant differences from others.

Additionally, 50% of respondents agreed that social networks offer similar information about what is happening on the front as compared to television. A statistically significant relationship ( $X^2(10)=195.829$ ,  $p<0.01$ ) was observed between this opinion and sources of information. Those who agreed were more spread among respondents who rely on social networks (66.5%) and television (70.3%). Notably, among those who primarily get information from social networks, 66.5% agreed with this perspective, while 41.2% disagreed, suggesting a range of opinions. Similarly, among those who did not agree that social networks provide comparable information to television, 41.2% were social network users, while 83.8% were television viewers. This pattern shows a clear divergence between the two groups, with a significant differ-



ence compared to other sources of information.

There was no significant difference in the degree of agreement with these two opinions across different gender and education levels.

Regarding the opinion that “social networks provide information about what is happening on the front lines more quickly than on television,” students (75%) are the group most likely to agree to some extent, while pensioners (44.5%) are the least likely to do so. However, when it comes to the statement that “social networks provide information about what is happening on the front as compared to television,” students still show significant agreement (62.5%), while pensioners are again the least likely to agree (36.6%).

The urban population generally agrees more with the idea that “social networks provide information about what is happening on the front more quickly than television,” with 68.7% expressing agreement compared to 55.6% of the rural population. Similarly, for the opinion that “social networks provide information about what is happening on the front as compared to television,” township residents (58%) and city residents (57.1%) are more in agreement compared to the rural population (47.3%).

Among those who served on the front line during the first Karabakh war, 55% agree to some degree with the statement that “social networks provide information about what is happening on the front more quickly than television,” while only 44.09% of those who served on the rear front in the war agree with this opinion. A similar trend is observed with the opinion that “social networks provide information about what is happening on the front as compared to television.”

The 18-25 age group is more likely to agree with the opinions that “social networks provide information about what is happening on the front lines more quickly than on television” (75.5%) and “social networks provide information about what is happening on the front as compared to television” (63.1%). Although no significant differences were observed in some categories, those living far from the conflict area (55.3%) are more likely to believe that social networks provide information about the front compared to television than those living near the frontline (42.6%).

## CONCLUSION

A nationwide survey conducted by the Social Research Center from August 24 to September 9, 2020, revealed that the vast majority of respondents who believed that a war was imminent felt that both the state and the people of Azerbaijan were prepared for it. These respondents also expressed a high level of confidence in the strength of the Azerbaijani army. Additionally, the survey showed that most of the country's population firmly believed that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would be resolved through military means under the leadership of President and Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev, a sentiment that remains strongly validated today.

❖ More than half of the population (56.1%) believes that a war is likely to start in the near future, with varying degrees of certainty. Among these respondents, those from Upper Karabakh are the most convinced, with 43.7% "very much believe" and 25% "mainly believe" that war is imminent.

❖ An overwhelming majority (94.4%) of respondents expressed confidence that the state of Azerbaijan is fully prepared for war. This high level of confidence is consistent across groups, regardless of their participation in the first Karabakh war, with indicators showing near-equal levels of certainty—94.2% for those who did not participate and 94.4% for those who did. Additionally, respondents from frontline and non-frontline regions similarly believed that the state of Azerbaijan is fully prepared for war, with 94.9% and 94% respectively agreeing with this statement.

❖ 94.8% of respondents noted that the people of Azerbaijan are fully prepared for war. Among those with family members in military service, 96.8% believe that the people are fully ready for war, while 94.5% of those without family members in service share this belief. This confidence is consistent across regions, with 93.7% of respondents from frontline areas and 96.4% from non-frontline areas agreeing that the Azerbaijani people are prepared for war.

❖ 98% of the population hold a high opinion of the strength of the Azerbaijani army. This includes 98.2% of those living near the Armenian border and the contact line with Nagorno-Karabakh, while 97.9% of those in other regions share this view.

❖ 93.1% of respondents believe that only the current leadership of the country can resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through military

means. This opinion has gained more credence following the successful liberation of Azerbaijani lands, driven by the strategic decisions and strong leadership of President and Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev. This belief is more prevalent among those living near the Armenian border and the contact line with Nagorno-Karabakh (90.5%) than among residents of other regions (77.9%). Furthermore, similar indicators were observed among those who participated in the First Karabakh War and those who did not, with 83% and 83.2% respectively agreeing that the conflict would be resolved by military means under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

❖ If the belief is that only the Supreme Commander-in-Chief can solve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue militarily, it is supported by several factors, including a strong army-building policy (57.6%), accurate assessment of the geopolitical landscape by the country's leader (48.2%), recent military victories (39.9%), and successful military cooperation with other countries (34.2%).

❖ In the event of a possible war, countries expected to support Azerbaijan are predominantly Turkey (99.8%), Pakistan (99.6%), and Ukraine (93.2%).

❖ Regarding the types of support, 87.5% of respondents believe that Azerbaijan would receive support in all areas, while 82.4% think Armenia would mainly receive military support. Residents in frontline regions expect more economic, humanitarian, and informational support for Azerbaijan compared to those in non-frontline areas.

❖ Over half of the population (53.8%) views Russia's obstruction of the war's start as the primary factor delaying the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. The second factor, noted by 48.1% of respondents, is the interest of major powers (USA, Russia, France) in keeping the problem unresolved. This view aligns with these countries' inadequate positions on the current situation. Other reasons identified by respondents include the UN's failure to implement resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (42.8%) and the strong activity of the Armenian diaspora abroad (27.1%). Notably, in Upper Karabakh, 47% of respondents attribute the delay in resolving the issue to the UN's failure to enforce resolutions.

❖ 89.6% of respondents believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven surrounding regions will be liberated with the onset of



the Second Karabakh War. Additionally, 30.5% suggest that this war would end the “defeated nation” syndrome, and the victorious image of Azerbaijan has become a source of pride for its citizens, both within and outside the country.

❖ While 44.5% of the population believe it's crucial to further strengthen the Azerbaijani state militarily to resolve the conflict, the scale and intensity of the counter-offensive operations have dispelled stereotypes about the strength and professionalism of the Azerbaijani army. Another 42.9% suggest Azerbaijan should start direct negotiations with Russia, and 37.4% recommend increasing the number of foreign partners.

❖ 69.8% of respondents believe the Azerbaijani army has demonstrated its superiority over the Armenian army by effectively countering the Armenian armed forces' provocations. Key outcomes of the counterattacks include the army's ability to prevent enemy provocations (61.8%) and defeat the enemy on its own (59.6%). These outcomes are seen as significant results of the Azerbaijani army's intense military operations aimed at achieving territorial integrity. Residents in the conflict area noted that the Azerbaijani army stopped enemy provocations in time (64.5%), showed its strength over the Armenian army (70.3%), and could defeat the enemy alone in war (60.7% and 58.9%).

❖ 56.8% of respondents link Armenia's attack on the Azerbaijan border on July 12, 2020, to its desire to disrupt major international projects in the region, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Another 46.2% believe Armenia deliberately provoked Azerbaijan. The desire to compensate for the April defeat (29.9%) is cited as one of the reasons for the Tovuz provocation.

❖ Nearly half of the respondents (46.5%) think that resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem through military means has become inevitable following the Tovuz battles. Among those with higher education, this opinion is even higher at 50.2%. Expected changes include geopolitical isolation leading to a political crisis in Armenia, ultimately resulting in their military failure (35.5%). The survey results in this context align with Armenia's current situation.

❖ A significant portion of the population (72%) views the events following July 12 as a historic opportunity to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. This perspective is especially strong among those with family members in military service, with 58.3% “completely agreeing” and

18.7% “mostly agreeing” that the current situation presents such an opportunity.

❖ Regarding the enemy's provocation in the Tovuz region, 79.4% of respondents believe that the Azerbaijani army should respond with an attack on Nagorno-Karabakh and other fronts.

❖ A large part of the population (78.1%) would feel safe to some extent during the war. Among these respondents, 49.9% would feel “completely safe” while 28.2% would feel “partially safe.” Notably, 83.3% of men and 72.8% of women said they would feel secure to some degree during the war. Age also plays a role, with 82.4% of those in the 18-25 age group and 84.7% of the 26-35 age group indicating they would feel safer during a conflict.

❖ When asked, “Would you or your family members go to the front to participate in the war?” 91.2% of respondents answered “yes.” This includes 96.8% of men and 85.5% of women. An absolute majority (over 90%) across all age groups indicated they would go to the front, with a slightly lower rate among those over 65 (88.1%), which is still quite high for this age group.

❖ 73.1% of respondents consider the unity between the people and the president, and 52.1% view the Azerbaijani state's strong army-building and military policy as the key factors in reclaiming the lands lost in the First Karabakh War through the latest battles.

❖ Regarding Russia's position on the Tovuz region provocation, 86.6% of respondents believe Russia is primarily interested in maintaining a military base in Armenia. Meanwhile, 73.3% associate Russia's position with a reluctance to confront Turkey in this conflict.

❖ 52.6% of respondents believe that the strictest bill ever introduced in the US Congress, recognizing the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, will have a positive effect on resolving the conflict, while 32.2% think it won't have any effect.

❖ 81.8% of the population rate the OSCE Minsk Group's role in conflict resolution as “bad.”

❖ During the war, an overwhelming majority expressed confidence in the Turkish army's direct military support, with this figure standing at 94.9%.

❖ Many respondents believe that the Turkish army's support is rooted in the friendly and brotherly relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan, with 90.8% endorsing this view.

❖ Those who do not believe in direct military support from the Turkish army for Azerbaijan attribute it to Turkey's reluctance to confront Russia (63.9%) and its desire to avoid opening an

additional front (48.5%).

❖ 87.6% of respondents rated the personnel reforms carried out by the President in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as “good” to some extent. Among those with refugee status, 91.3% viewed the reforms positively, while 87.2% of those without refugee status shared this view.

❖ Regarding the impact of the new appointment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, 43.3% believe it will enhance the country’s international reputation, 32.1% expect it to positively affect the military-political process on the Nagorno-Karabakh front, and 29.7% think it will lead to more active, systematic, and flexible diplomacy.

❖ During the active military operations in Tovuz, more than half of the population expressed support for the state of Azerbaijan (48.4%) and its army (48.6%). Men were more likely to support the Azerbaijani army (59% compared to 37.8% for women) and the state (58.6% compared to 37.6% for women). The 18-25 age group (56.7%) and 26-35 age group (57.8%) showed the most support for the state.

❖ 51.6% did not show support for the state, 51.4% did not show support for the army.

❖ 57.2% of the population shared patriotic messages on social networks. Those who defended Azerbaijan against Armenian claims ranked second (34.8%). Students were the most active, with 83.8% sharing patriotic messages and 46% defending the state against Armenian claims. Housewives (71.8%) and public sector workers (63.9%) ranked second and third in sharing patriotic content. Additionally, people from the frontline region (42.9%) provided more food aid to soldiers serving in military units compared to those in non-frontline regions (15.2%). Interestingly, those living far from the conflict area were more likely to attend the burials of martyrs than those from frontline regions, with 32% and 17.6%, respectively.

❖ Among the reasons given by those who did not show support for the state or army, compliance with quarantine rules was the most common (48.5%), followed by personal circumstances like health (28.8%).

❖ 55.3% of respondents believe that the public march in support of the state and the Commander-in-Chief demonstrated support for the army, 53.1% saw it as unity against the enemy, and 52.5% viewed it as a show of unity between the people, the army, and the state.

❖ However, 24% of respondents indicated

that a group entering parliament during the July 14 march aimed to create a police-citizen conflict, while 22.7% believed the goal was to incite unrest similar to the 1990s.

❖ 78.9% of the population gets information about the front during the war from television, with Khazar TV being the most-watched channel, as 77% of the population get their frontline news from it. ATV ranks second, with 58.9% of the population tuning in for frontline news. AzTV is third at 46.7%. Other popular channels include Real TV (36.8%), ITV (26%), and Space TV (23.3%). Television’s role in providing information became more prominent during the 44-day Patriotic War due to limited internet access, which reduced the impact of social networks. The high ratings of television channels can be attributed to their extensive war-related coverage and their substantial airtime dedicated to frontline events.

❖ Social networks rank second among information sources, with 47.2% of the population using them to stay updated on the frontlines. Among social networks, Facebook leads with 58.4% viewership, followed by YouTube (38.9%) and Instagram (37.5%). However, only 44.3% of respondents trust the frontline news they receive from social networks.

❖ After television and social networks, the third most popular source of information during war conditions is communication with people around them, with 17.8% of the population relying on this source. Meanwhile, 35.9% of respondents trust the information they receive from these informal networks.

❖ 58.8% of respondents agree with the statement that “social networks provide information about what is happening on the front more quickly than on television.”

❖ However, 50% of respondents believe that social networks provide information of similar quality compared to television regarding news from the front.

## ADDITIONS

Care and attention given to refugees and internally displaced persons during the reign of National leader Heydar Aliyev and President Ilham Aliyev

The care and attention given to refugees and internally displaced people during the period of national leader Heydar Aliyev's rule

**71.800.000 ₼** Funds allocated from the State Oil Fund

<b>2049</b> More than 2049 private residences	<b>36</b> Kindergarten	<b>4</b> Hospital
<b>18</b> Administrative building	<b>20</b> Communication house	<b>6</b> Music school
<b>33</b> School building	<b>20</b> Club-community center	<b>29</b> Medical station

Care and attention given to refugees and internally displaced persons during the reign of President Ilham Aliyev (2003-2019)

Allocated funding:

**3.4** billion manat - state budget   **2.3** billion manat - State Oil Fund   **1.4** billion manats - International financial institutions

Number of families accommodated in new apartments

2004-2008	2009-2013	2014-2019
<b>10.401</b>	<b>15.125</b>	<b>15.636</b>

Was built:

<b>866</b> Electric transformer	<b>156</b> School
<b>227</b> Water tank	<b>65</b> Kindergarten
<b>217</b> Artesian well	<b>63</b> Healthcare
<b>84</b> Pump station	<b>62</b> House of culture
<b>1</b> Electric substation	<b>2</b> Olympic sports complex

Apartments for the disabled and families of martyrs of the Karabakh war

1997-2018	2018	2019	2020
<b>6179</b>	<b>626</b>	<b>934</b>	<b>800</b>

## NOTES

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